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Stingy News Quarterly 2008: Q1 2007: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2006: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2005: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2004: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2003: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2002: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2001: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Stingy News Weekly 2008 05: 04 11 04: 06 13 20 27 03: 02 09 16 23 30 02: 03 10 17 24 01: 06 13 20 27 2007 12: 02 09 16 23 30 11: 04 11 18 25 10: 07 14 21 28 09: 02 09 16 23 30 08: 05 12 19 26 07: 01 08 15 22 27 06: 03 10 17 23 05: 06 13 20 27 04: 01 08 15 22 29 03: 04 11 18 25 02: 04 11 18 25 01: 07 14 21 28 Dan's Reports Fund fees revisited T class funds Bonds vs. bond funds Bear market protectors Investing in bonds Ignore bonds at your peril Coping with change Future of trust funds Dilution trumps Are fees excessive? Performance anxiety Top advisory model? 81-106 a step back Poor fund classifications Pension shortfall A longer-term report card Information overload About Dan Privacy Policy |
The Stingy News Weekly (03/04/2007)"The fact that people will be full of greed, fear or folly is predictable. The sequence is not predicatable." - Warren Buffett Stingy Links http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/articles/articlearchive.shtml Why subprime lenders are in trouble http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2007/db20070302_477856.htm?chan=top+news_top+news+index_businessweek+exclusives "As the subprime mortgage market goes into steep decline, threatening to drag the whole economy along with it, many people are wondering what could have gone so wrong so quickly. Until recently, after all, delinquency and foreclosure rates on subprime loans were reassuringly low. The answer may lie in how the quality of these mortgages has changed over the years. While subprime is the term used for loans issued to people with poor credit, not all subprime loans are created equal. And the subprime loans that were originated in 2006 that are turning out to be shockingly weak." Big insider-trading bust http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/mar2007/db20070301_941827.htm?chan=top+news_top+news+index_top+story "The case involves allegations that hedge funds bought information about impending rating changes on stocks from an executive at UBS, got tips about upcoming corporate mergers from a former Morgan Stanley compliance officer, and paid a Bank of America broker for the right to get shares in hot initial public offerings. There's even a charge that some day traders, who had gotten wind of the alleged activities, were shaking down other traders for money to keep secret their role in the purported insider-trading scheme." Berkshire Hathaway's 5-star stocks http://news.morningstar.com/article/printArticle.asp?id=186894 "In its recent filing, Berkshire disclosed three new positions: Ingersoll-Rand Company (IR), United Healthcare (UNH), and US Bancorp (USB). It should be noted that Berkshire had been accumulating its stake in US Bancorp since early 2006 but had been granted permission to delay the filing of this position over the last couple of quarters. Berkshire also modestly boosted its stake in Wells Fargo (WFC) and USG (USG)." Berkshire Hathaway annual for 2006 http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2006ar/2006ar.pdf "Let me end this section by telling you about one of the good guys of Wall Street, my long-time friend Walter Schloss, who last year turned 90. From 1956 to 2002, Walter managed a remarkably successful investment partnership, from which he took not a dime unless his investors made money. My admiration for Walter, it should be noted, is not based on hindsight. A full fifty years ago, Walter was my sole recommendation to a St. Louis family who wanted an honest and able investment manager." A devilish delusion http://www.bankstocks.com/article.asp?type=1&id=9881307 "In 1982, the Academy Award for Best Costume Design went to a film called Chariots of Fire, the story of a couple of upper-class Brits as they trained for and competed in the 1924 Paris Olympics. (You had to be there.) The movie was the year's big hit; it won a slew of awards, including Best Picture. Have you seen Chariots of Fire? It's about track and field; the actors basically spend the bulk of the movie running around in their underwear. Bam - give'em the costumes Oscar!" The sure thing almost nobody plays http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/simon052/98014660.html "Imagine you are entering a deluxe, well-appointed casino. Off the lavish entry foyer, there are two ample gambling wings, one hued in reds, the other in muted greens. The red wing looks enticing, but if I may insist, let's first enter the less crowded green rooms to watch the action. The atmosphere is unhurried, the blackjack tables are sparsely attended, and every player sits behind a mound of green and black chips. You think at first you've come to the wrong place. You see the ordinary table limits, the ordinary clothes, the ordinary games. But then how did these ordinary people get such piles of money? Then it comes to you. They're all winning. In fact, as you walk around the green wing, you hardly can find a losing player. You know, of course, that the average house take on table games is 5%, but as you count winning and losing hands, you realize these players are getting a better break. They seem to be gaining at a rate of 60% to 40%. You start fresh and take another count. The results are the same. A pit boss appears at your shoulder. "Excuse me," you say, "but can this be right? The odds favor the players?" "Yes, indeed. The odds in the green room usually run 60 to 40. It's been that way since we opened." "But...most of the players must go away winners." "They sure do. At those odds, we calculate that 9,999 out of 10,000 make money. At our high-stakes tables in the back, they do even better, with winners running about 20,000 to 1. It's a good thing we get so few players, or they'd break the house." Somewhat amazed, you thank him and shake your head. There's no time to lose, you decide, but you'll need more than the few dollars you have in your pocket. You hatch a plan to gather your life savings, come back to the casino, and win the bundle you've been dreaming of. On your way out, you glance into the red wing. The action level is much, much higher. The room is crowded and fairly roars with excitement. Can it be even better here, you wonder? Curious, you go in. Players bet multiple table positions, wave frantically for change, entreat the gods for luck. You see few green and black chips, fewer winning players. The piles of chips in front of them are dwindling with each hand. In fact, the odds are worse than normal. Again, you start to count. Although the players continue to excitedly toss in their chips, the odds appear to be maybe 60 to 40 in favor of the house. Once more, your curiosity whetted, you walk over to a pit boss and ask her the odds at these tables. She tells you what you suspected. They are 60 to 40 in favor of the casino. Warming up to the subject, she chuckles and says, "This room coins gold for the casino, the chances are 9,999 in 10,000 rounds that we wind up winners." You don't have to be a genius to see that this is obviously not the place you want to be. You go home and get your stash. You return to the casino with your fistful of money, excited, eager for action, all the time figuring how you'll do even better at the game. But then a strange thing happens. You walk into the red wing and start to play." Are good companies bad investments? http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/03/05/8401291/index.htm?postversion=2007022606 "From 1983 to 2006, the mean annualized return of the less admired companies was 17.8 percent, beating the more admired group's 15.4 percent return. Interestingly, both groups beat the S&P 500's 11.2 percent return over the same period." Stocks of admired companies and despised ones http://business.scu.edu/finance/faculty/statman/articles/fortune020907.pdf "Do stocks of admired companies yield admirable returns? We study Fortune magazine's annual list of "America's Most Admired Companies" and find that stocks of admired companies had lower returns, on average, than stocks of despised companies during the 23 years from April 1983 through March 2006. We link differences between the returns of stocks of admired and despised companies to differences in affect, the quick feeling that distinguishes good from bad, admired from despised. The affect of admired companies is positive, and investors who were attracted by affect to stocks of admired companies paid for it with lower returns. However, the relative returns of stocks of admired and despised companies varied considerably from year to year and from decade to decade and the relationship between admiration and returns is not always monotonic." S&P/TSX60 Value Screens http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy.shtml High Dividend Yield Stocks P/E P/B P/S P/C P/D Yield* ============================================== === === === === === ====== BCE (BCE) 4 4 4 5 5 5 Transalta (TA) 1 5 3 4 5 5 Bank of Montreal (BMO) 4 4 3 3 5 5 TransCanada (TRP) 3 4 2 4 5 5 Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) 3 3 3 2 5 5 National Bank of Canada (NA) 4 4 3 2 5 5 Enbridge (ENB) 2 2 4 3 5 5 Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) 3 3 3 2 5 5 Royal Bank (RY) 3 2 3 2 4 4 CIBC (CM) 4 2 3 2 4 4 More Info: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/dogs.shtml Value Ratio Stocks P/E P/B P/S P/C P/D VR ============================================== === === === === === ===== BCE (BCE) 4 4 4 5 5 2.7 Teck Cominco Limited (TCK.B) 5 3 2 3 4 2.7 Bank of Montreal (BMO) 4 4 3 3 5 3.4 National Bank of Canada (NA) 4 4 3 2 5 3.7 Encana (ECA) 5 4 2 4 3 4.1 Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) 3 3 3 2 5 4.1 Husky Energy (HSE) 5 2 2 4 4 4.1 TransCanada (TRP) 3 4 2 4 5 4.6 CIBC (CM) 4 2 3 2 4 4.8 Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) 3 3 3 2 5 5.1 More Info: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/valueratio.shtml Graham Stocks P/E P/B P/D G$ dG$(%) ============================================== === === === ====== ====== Domtar (DTC) 5 5 0 14.67 51.25 Encana (ECA) 5 4 3 63.72 15.31 Lundin Mining Corporation (LUN) 4 5 0 13.04 8.68 Magna Cl.A (MG.A) 3 5 2 89.77 4.80 Teck Cominco Limited (TCK.B) 5 3 4 83.42 3.98 Weston George (WN) 4 5 3 73.28 3.58 Ipsco (IPS) 5 3 1 126.09 2.38 More Info: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/graham.shtml *Notes: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/notes.shtml Books for Stingy Investors Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Next Generation by David Dreman David Dreman has provided perhaps the best modern book on value investing and the markets. He goes from the basics through to advanced topics and the sheer amount of useful information in his book is remarkable. As an added bonus, Dreman's writing is clear and approachable - a feat rarely seen in investing books. All but the most grizzled market veteran will pick up a few good ideas from Contrarian Investment Strategies: The Next Generation. Amazon Link: http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0684813505/ Stock Research From Dan Hallett & Associates The Rothery Report http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/store.shtml The Rothery Report provides research on select deep-value stocks in North America. Discover overlooked and undervalued stocks in quarterly investment reports which provide detailed analysis of Canadian and U.S. stocks. Weekly email news and additional updates keep subscribers informed about new opportunities and developments. Rothery Report Performance (03/31/2001 to 12/31/2006) Average Capital Gain Average Holding Period Sold Stocks: 76.6% Sold Stocks: 2.0 Years All Stocks: 50.8% All Stocks: 2.3 Years Special Bonus Reports: Top Smaller Stocks 2007 http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/store/TopSmallStocks.shtml Learn More http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/store.shtml Subscribe Today http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/store/order.shtml If you'd like to suggest The Stingy News to a friend, please point them to: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/cgi-bin/email.cgi Please visit the StingyInvestor website at http://www.stingyinvestor.com To (un)subscribe please use our email centre at http://www.stingyinvestor.com/cgi-bin/email.cgi Email comments or questions to info@stingyinvestor.com Refer to legal & conflict of interest disclaimers at http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/legal.shtml ISSN 1499-2795 Copyright Dan Hallett and Associates Inc., 2007. All rights reserved. The securities mentioned in this report are not appropriate for all investors. Consult your professional investment advisor before making any investment decision. While all reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of information and data contained herein, accuracy can not be guaranteed. Past performance is not a good predictor of future performance. Results are not guaranteed and we assume no liability whatsoever for any material losses that may occur. No compensation for suggesting particular securities or financial advisors is solicited or accepted. The information in this newsletter, and in its related website, is not intended to be, nor does it constitute, financial advice or recommendations. Investing in stocks can be risky and may result in substantial losses. A Dan Hallett and Associates Inc.(DH&A) publication. DH&A is registered as Investment Counsel in the province of Ontario. DH&A, or related-parties may have an interest in the securities mentioned. | ||||
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A Dan Hallett and Associates Inc. publication. Norm Rothery, Ph.D., CFA, is the Chief Investment Strategist at Dan Hallett and Associates Inc. (DH&A) and the founder of StingyInvestor.com. DH&A is registered as Investment Counsel in the province of Ontario. Norm, DH&A, or related-parties may have an interest in the securities mentioned. More... | |||||