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Stingy News Quarterly 2008: Q1 2007: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2006: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2005: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2004: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2003: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2002: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2001: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Stingy News Weekly 2008 05: 04 11 04: 06 13 20 27 03: 02 09 16 23 30 02: 03 10 17 24 01: 06 13 20 27 2007 12: 02 09 16 23 30 11: 04 11 18 25 10: 07 14 21 28 09: 02 09 16 23 30 08: 05 12 19 26 07: 01 08 15 22 27 06: 03 10 17 23 05: 06 13 20 27 04: 01 08 15 22 29 03: 04 11 18 25 02: 04 11 18 25 01: 07 14 21 28 Dan's Reports Fund fees revisited T class funds Bonds vs. bond funds Bear market protectors Investing in bonds Ignore bonds at your peril Coping with change Future of trust funds Dilution trumps Are fees excessive? Performance anxiety Top advisory model? 81-106 a step back Poor fund classifications Pension shortfall A longer-term report card Information overload About Dan Privacy Policy |
The Stingy News Weekly (08/26/2007)"I've seen more people fail because of liquor and leverage - leverage being borrowed money. You really don't need leverage in this world much. If you're smart, you're going to make a lot of money without borrowing." - Warren Buffett Stingy Links http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/articles/articlearchive.shtml In nature's casino http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/magazine/26neworleans-t.html?pagewanted=all "From Miami to San Francisco, the nation's priciest real estate now faced beaches and straddled fault lines; its most vibrant cities occupied its most hazardous land. If, after World War II, you had set out to redistribute wealth to maximize the sums that might be lost to nature, you couldn't have done much better than Americans had done. And virtually no one - not even the weather bookies - fully understood the true odds." A psychology lesson from the markets http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/yourmoney/26view.htm "Many people feel that they have discovered their true inner genius as investors and have relished the new self-expression and excitement. Investors across the world have been thinking that they are winners - not recognizing that much of their success is only a result of a boom. Declines in asset prices endanger this very self-esteem. That is why it is so hard to turn around investor attitudes once a downward psychology sets in. The Fed and other central banks do not have lithium or Prozac in their bag of remedies, and so cannot control it." How rich friends make you feel poor http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/SavingandDebt/SaveMoney/HowEnvyWrecksYourFinances.aspx "Trying to live as if you have more money than you do may be one of the biggest causes of financial distress in America today, and nobody wants to talk about it." Fed bends rules to help two big banks http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/24/magazines/fortune/eavis_citigroup.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2007082417 "The regulations in question effectively limit a bank's funding exposure to an affiliate to 10% of the bank's capital. But the Fed has allowed Citibank and Bank of America to blow through that level. Citigroup and Bank of America are able to lend up to $25 billion apiece under this exemption, according to the Fed. If Citibank used the full amount, "that represents about 30% of Citibank's total regulatory capital, which is no small exemption," says Charlie Peabody, banks analyst at Portales Partners. The Fed says that it made the exemption in the public interest, because it allows Citibank to get liquidity to the brokerage in "the most rapid and cost-effective manner possible." So, how serious is this rule-bending? Very. One of the central tenets of banking regulation is that banks with federally insured deposits should never be over-exposed to brokerage subsidiaries; indeed, for decades financial institutions were legally required to keep the two units completely separate. This move by the Fed eats away at the principle." Wells Fargo gorges on mark-to-make-believe gains http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aY8m0nta94GA&refer=home "The board last September approved a new, three-level hierarchy for measuring 'fair values' of assets and liabilities, under a pronouncement called FASB Statement No. 157, which Wells Fargo adopted in January. Level 1 means the values come from quoted prices in active markets. The balance-sheet changes then pass through the income statement each quarter as gains or losses. Call this mark-to- market. Level 2 values are measured using 'observable inputs,' such as recent transaction prices for similar items, where market quotes aren't available. Call this mark-to-model. Then there's Level 3. Under Statement 157, this means fair value is measured using 'unobservable inputs.' While companies can't actually see the changes in the fair values of their assets and liabilities, they're allowed to book them through earnings anyway, based on their own subjective assumptions. Call this mark-to-make-believe." The evolution of the idea of 'value investing' http://static.scribd.com/docs/1n1dfayqyiq5b.pdf "Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd's Security Analysis, first published in 1934, brought structure and logic to the field, creating an intellectual framework for sound investment. In an area where much looks foolish shortly after publication, Graham's principles have proved reliable for over sixty-five years." Housing woes hit high end http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/19/real_estate/mortgage_luxury.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2007082008 "The jumbos are probably a bigger impediment than fear. The term refers to home loans in excess of $417,000. By rule, they cannot be guaranteed by the government-sponsored mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Of late, if Fannie or Freddie aren't vouching for your loan, there's trouble. As with most mortgages, jumbos are typically bundled together by lenders and then resold to investors (often mutual or pension funds) as mortgage-backed securities. The problem: The rising number of defaults on subprime mortgages -- particularly among borrowers who took out interest-only or other exotic loans -- has laid bare the, um, less than diligent practices of many lenders. That has spooked investors and dried up the secondary market for mortgages -- even those of sterling quality -- that aren't guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie. Unable to resell their jumbo mortgages on Wall Street, lenders are now making far fewer mega-loans, and those they are making charge much more onerous interest." The escape of the enablers http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/22/magazines/fortune/sloan_enablers.fortune/ "Wall Street loves to talk about letting financial markets weed out the weak. But when the Street itself gets in trouble, it sticks out its little tin cup, asking for help. And gets it. The subprime-mortgage-market meltdown is a classic example of the way small fry get devoured, but the whales of Wall Street get rescued. Here's the deal: People with crummy credit who took out mortgages are being allowed to fail in record numbers. The mortgage companies that made those loans are being allowed to fail. The Street itself? It's bailout city. Even before the Fed made a symbolic half-point cut in the discount rate, it and other central banks from Switzerland to Singapore were trying to rescue the Street by injecting hundreds of billions of dollars into the financial markets and announcing they will put up more, if needed." Tough love on Wall Street http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/17/magazines/fortune/gross_column.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2007082006 "The past few weeks have exposed a giant crack in modern financial architecture, created by youthful wizards and endorsed for its diversity by central bankers present and past. While the newborn derivatives may hedge individual institutional and sector risk, they cannot eliminate the Waldos. In fact, the inherent leverage that accompanies derivative creation may foster systemic risk when information is unavailable or delayed in its release. Nothing within the current marketplace allows for the hedging of liquidity risk, and that is the problem at the moment. Only the central banks can solve this puzzle, with their own liquidity infusions and perhaps a series of rate cuts. The markets stand by with apprehension." S&P/TSX60 Value Screens http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy.shtml High Dividend Yield Stocks P/E P/B P/S P/C P/D Yield* ============================================== === === === === === ====== Biovail (BVF) 4 4 2 5 5 5 National Bank of Canada (NA) 5 5 4 3 5 5 Bank of Montreal (BMO) 4 4 3 3 5 5 TransCanada (TRP) 3 4 2 4 5 5 BCE (BCE) 3 3 3 4 5 5 Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) 4 3 2 2 5 5 Enbridge (ENB) 2 3 5 3 5 5 Transalta (TA) 0 4 3 4 5 5 Royal Bank (RY) 4 2 3 2 5 5 CIBC (CM) 5 2 4 2 4 4 More Info: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/dogs.shtml Value Ratio Stocks P/E P/B P/S P/C P/D VR ============================================== === === === === === ===== Biovail (BVF) 4 4 2 5 5 1.7 National Bank of Canada (NA) 5 5 4 3 5 2.3 CIBC (CM) 5 2 4 2 4 3.3 Bank of Montreal (BMO) 4 4 3 3 5 3.4 Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) 4 3 2 2 5 3.7 Teck Cominco Limited (TCK.B) 5 3 4 5 4 4.0 Royal Bank (RY) 4 2 3 2 5 4.0 BCE (BCE) 3 3 3 4 5 4.1 TransCanada (TRP) 3 4 2 4 5 4.5 Husky Energy (HSE) 4 2 4 5 4 4.6 More Info: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/valueratio.shtml Graham Stocks P/E P/B P/D G$ dG$(%) ============================================== === === === ====== ====== MDS Inc. (MDS) 5 5 0 40.26 99.80 Lundin Mining Corporation (LUN) 5 5 0 16.76 46.34 National Bank of Canada (NA) 5 5 5 58.14 3.73 Magna Cl.A (MG.A) 4 5 3 95.83 2.59 More Info: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/graham.shtml *Notes: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/strategy/notes.shtml Books for Stingy Investors Value Investing: A Balanced Approach by Martin J. Whitman Value Investing encourages investors to cast off the tyranny of earnings and to focus instead on balance sheets and book values. Well-capitalised firms can withstand an occasional headwind and can be excellent values provided that they are bought for reasonable prices. Safe and cheap are the driving factors for value investors. Although Whitman's prose is occasionally a bit dry, his useful ideas makes Value Investing well worth reading. Amazon Link: http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471398101/ Stock Research From Dan Hallett & Associates The Rothery Report http://www.rotheryreport.com/ The Rothery Report provides research on select deep-value stocks in North America. Discover overlooked and undervalued stocks in quarterly investment reports which provide detailed analysis of Canadian and U.S. stocks. Weekly email news and additional updates keep subscribers informed about new opportunities and developments. Rothery Report Performance (03/31/2001 to 06/30/2007) Average Capital Gain Average Holding Period Sold Stocks: 74.1% Sold Stocks: 2.1 Years All Stocks: 53.6% All Stocks: 2.4 Years Special Bonus Reports: Top Smaller Stocks 2007 http://www.rotheryreport.com/store/TopSmallStocks.shtml Learn More http://www.rotheryreport.com/store/store.shtml Subscribe Today http://www.rotheryreport.com/store/order.shtml If you'd like to suggest The Stingy News to a friend, please point them to: http://www.stingyinvestor.com/cgi-bin/email.cgi Please visit the StingyInvestor website at http://www.stingyinvestor.com To (un)subscribe please use our email centre at http://www.stingyinvestor.com/cgi-bin/email.cgi Email comments or questions to info@stingyinvestor.com Refer to legal & conflict of interest disclaimers at http://www.stingyinvestor.com/SI/legal.shtml ISSN 1499-2795 Copyright Dan Hallett and Associates Inc., 2007. All rights reserved. The securities mentioned in this report are not appropriate for all investors. Consult your professional investment advisor before making any investment decision. While all reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of information and data contained herein, accuracy can not be guaranteed. Past performance is not a good predictor of future performance. Results are not guaranteed and we assume no liability whatsoever for any material losses that may occur. No compensation for suggesting particular securities or financial advisors is solicited or accepted. The information in this newsletter, and in its related website, is not intended to be, nor does it constitute, financial advice or recommendations. Investing in stocks can be risky and may result in substantial losses. A Dan Hallett and Associates Inc.(DH&A) publication. DH&A is registered as Investment Counsel in the province of Ontario. DH&A, or related-parties may have an interest in the securities mentioned. | ||||
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A Dan Hallett and Associates Inc. publication. Norm Rothery, Ph.D., CFA, is the Chief Investment Strategist at Dan Hallett and Associates Inc. (DH&A) and the founder of StingyInvestor.com. DH&A is registered as Investment Counsel in the province of Ontario. Norm, DH&A, or related-parties may have an interest in the securities mentioned. More... | |||||